Abstract: In recent years, computational research methods, digital trace data and online human interactions have contributed to the emergence of new technology-oriented sub-fields within International Relations (IR). Although the cybersecurity scholarship had an initial promise to be the primus inter pares among these emerging fields, the main thrust of this new methodological innovation came through the 'digital conflict studies' sub-field. By integrating Internet and social media research tools and questions into its core topics of sub-national violence, terrorism and radical mobilization, digital conflict studies has recently succeeded in addressing some of the data validity and methodology problems faced by the cybersecurity scholarship. This article begins by briefly reviewing some of the persistent data and method-oriented hurdles faced by the cybersecurity scholarship. Then, it moves onto a more detailed account of how digital conflict studies have been addressing some of these deadlocks by focusing individually on the literature on onset, mobilization, targeting, intensity/duration and termination phases of conflicts. Ultimately, the article concludes with the suggestion that the cybersecurity scholarship could move past its own deadlocks by building more granular and dedicated research datasets and establishing mechanisms to share event data with the scientific community.
INTRODUCTION
The long-touted theoretical slumber of International Relations (IR) as a discipline 1 was markedly disturbed by the advent of the cybersecurity scholarship. Described by many scholars as the 'real fourth domain', even surpassing the importance of space, digitization of human power relations and their competition across an entirely new ground -cyber -opened up the way for the 'revival' of IR. 2 The pre-cyber IR was deadlocked for two main reasons: first, in the aftermath of the Cold War the field had lost its connection to the very origins of its existence -likelihood of large-scale globalized war. With no pressing global threat to study and theorize, the field was split across deconstructivist and post-positivist sub-strands that ran into their own set of limitations 3 . Second, the post-9/11 turn in IR had lowered the analytical lens of the bulk of the discipline into terrorism and sub-national violence, making IR more of a surrogate mother of a comparative civil war or rebel dynamics offspring. The conflict studies field has exploded so much in the last decade that it has ended up almost swallowing IR. Yet, it focused more on insurgency, micro-dynamics of violence with a heavy focus on dyadic socio-political interactions between state and non-state actors, none of which being the central thrust of the IR as a discipline.
Cybersecurity promised salvation to IR from being sucked up into the vortex of conflict and terrorism research. It offered scholars a truly global network of state and non-state (benign and malicious) interactions pool, made some of the more classical concepts of the field (such as bandwagoning, hedging, deterrence, retaliation) relevant again and offered a new research agenda that went beyond conflict and violence. Attribution problems brought a new cyber-institutionalist tradition 4 . Attacker's advantage in cybersecurity re-introduced the question of alliances, balancing and confidence-building measures 5 . The fluid and largely uncharted nature of cyberspace reminded scholars of the importance of the anarchy and hegemony debate, as well as the centrality of the rules and norms literature in IR. While cyber hasn't yet influenced the field as much as either conventional or nuclear weapons did back in the Cold War, it has undoubtedly introduced a new wave of issue-broadening nudges, briefly widening the discipline's obsession with sub-national violence. However, cyber-research also ended up in a cul-de-sac of sorts. Due to the sheer magnitude of 'events' in cyber research, it brought a range of conceptual and measurement problems. These problems have led to some unforthcoming answers to essential questions about how to study the field: What constitutes a cyber 'attack' 6 ?
How do we disentangle offensive and defensive capabilities in cyber 7 ? How do we acquire and catalogue event data, given the sheer magnitude and near-impossibility of reliably measuring cyber competition? How do we verify the accuracy of attribution? Given attribution problems, how do we reliably establish norms and minimize commitment problems in compliance? Who are we establishing norms for, or against? On the other end of the debate is the 'megafauna' argument that criticized the field's over-emphasis on a small number on politically critical cyber events (usually with physical implications), overlooking the importance of the large volume of 'smaller events' that don't have a measurable or visible impact on infrastructure or systems 8 . Both ends of the debate give us a different hurdle facing cyber-research: do we have too much, or too little measurable data to work with? All of these data availability and quality issues of cyber haven't prevented theorizing about it in IR but made empirical tests of those claims highly difficult.
Ultimately, it ran into two difficulties: first, an inability to grow beyond the confines of traditional IR and second, dangerously treading on the 'purely theoretical' territory. Even when thinking solely in terms of the disruptive effects of cyber, the nuclear analogy ran into a number of problems. After all, nuclear weapons had a binary nature -they are either detonated or not detonated. Their deterrent nature came from the possibility of detonation. Cybersecurity, on the other hand, is anything but binary. DDoS, MitM, spear phishing, SQL injection and XXS are different attack types that serve a different purpose. Often, the target learns about the fact that it was attacked weeks after the actual incident. More sophisticated forms of cyberattacks are also hard to notice, measure, turn into event data and are even harder to attribute to an actor. Its twists and turns, intensity and type all require a much more nuanced understanding of the engineering aspects of the field compared to nuclear weapons. It also rendered a truly multi-method approach, through combined forces of computer engineers, data scientists and IR specialists necessary, but this kind of sustained interdisciplinarity is Compared to cybersecurity, where data is both uncontrollably large, elusive and fast, Internet research has rendered the study of human interactions in digital space more manageable. Although data size and speed can still be an issue, social media data is less elusive compared to cybersecurity data and depending on the platform and topic, scraping entire sets of public data can be far easier compared to cataloguing cyber event data. Also, the secrecy and covertness of cybersecurity research can be a deterrent factor for social scientists, which might explain why more of them are switching to the open source nature of social media research. Furthermore, although cyber research is significantly important for IR theory, it lies distant to the wider empirical debates on sample size, representativeness, measurement, causal effects, and behavioural Social media has expedited the dissemination of frames related to sustained political grievances and opportunities 19 . Its scope and speed led to the emergence of nongeographical communities of grievance, all receiving information about repression, disenfranchisement, and oppression from their areas of concern 20 . Similarly, and a strategy best employed by ISIS, opportunity structures in conflict, such as wealth, prestige and social acceptance are now transmitted across the world, leading to the mobilization of an unprecedented level of diversity in its recruits 21 . Of course, social media is not the only medium through which such frames have been disseminated in the past. Newspapers, novels and motion picture have all helped communicate grievance and greed narratives in the past. What makes social media novel, however, is its speed and size. Compared to older forms of media (perhaps, with the slight exception of the live broadcasting technologies), social media and the Internet offer real-time dissemination of narratives to a far larger audience. Some of the time-lag and media access (urban/rural, rich/poor) constraints that were the hallmarks of older examples of grievance/greed narrative diffusion are less relevant in the case of social media. Owing to the lowered barriers of entry, digital communication thus increases the speed and size of both the responses to framing stimuli and also the materialization of counternarratives.
In addition to speed and scale, ICTs also offer a permanent, non-physical and omniaccessible archival function for its users 22 . This is especially valid for grievance 23 , which is a crucial driver of early mobilization. By both spreading and permanently recording events and narratives in digital space, users bestow an archival power to digital media. This, in turn, allows grievances to be communicated not just quicker, but also consumed in a sustained and at-will manner. In addition to enabling masses to mobilize quickly, this sustained grievance effect of ICTs also intensifies existing social, ethnic and religious tensions, through daily access and consumption of grievance-related content 24 . This does not only impact the likelihood and frequency of conflicts but also determines the size and social support for these conflicts. In a way, the real-time archival utility of social media both drives violence onset likelihood, as well as how intense these acts of violence become. This is true both for the digital content disseminated by a single source to multiple individual users (propaganda and information cascades) and also content sought and acquired by the users themselves (information-seeking).
ICTs and conflict onset are a relatively well-studied dyad. Currently, some of the frontiers in this sub-field remain the use of fake news, trolls and bots -deliberate information manipulators -and identify how they impact greed/grievance dynamic differently than the flow of accurate information 25 (locals who document cartel violence on weblogs and social media) have any effect on conflict awareness and mobilization. They discover that districts that contain more public media bloggers and thus, are exposed to greater volume and frequency of conflict reporting have a greater tendency to be desensitized and less likely to participate in violence.
Wang (et al.) 32 on the other hand explore the digital impact of the Sandy Hook shootings on users' sentiments on gun control, discovering that anti-violence (pro-guncontrol) sentiments linger on much longer compared to anti-gun control content in the aftermath of the shooting. They also demonstrate that these pro-gun-control sentiments linger on longer in Connecticut (the incident state), compared to other states in the United States, invalidating the main premise of the 'terror management theory'. In the 27 Farwell, "The Media Strategy of ISIS"; Elizabeth Pearson, "Online as the New Frontline: Affect, Gender, and ISIS- drivers of the staying power of movements is how well they mobilize resources 38 . This mobilization is not just limited to manpower or financial resources but also includes sustenance of frames, attention, alliances, commitment and organizational cohesion. To that end, the advent of social media and the Internet are primarily thought as positive drivers of resource mobilization. After all, this was one of the main reasons why the early works on the Arab Spring and Occupy movements were quick to call them 'social media revolutions' 39 . When dissidents discovered their latent power through digital interconnectivity, they were able to come together and challenge hegemony, or so the logic went. However, later studies have proved that this was not always the case 40 .
Social media was a significant development but was also exaggerated in its effect on social movements. ICTs did drive attention and awareness, but these two variables had a mixed effect on actual mobilization, commitment or staying power. Rather, ICTs effects relied on pre-existing traditional networks and trust relations; it is only when these existing networks are in place that ICTs could play a major role.
This necessitates a greater empirical focus on the analytical sweet spot that delves into how traditional social networks use and deploy ICTs to generate sustained resource. Mostly, studies omit this context and try to draw a straightforward causal link between how much movements use social media and how well they mobilize. Furthermore, past the onset and mobilization mark, few studies explore how movements sustain both ideological and material resources, especially when the rival actor is also a non-state actor 41 . To that end, most scholarship focuses on how protestors, rioters, militias and terrorist groups utilize ICTs against state actors, but not much on how this interaction materializes between and within non-state actors themselves. Some of the most novel ways of studying mobilization dynamics can be seen in Gahot (et al.) 42 where the authors use epidemiological modelling to see the diffusion and sustenance of the 2005
French riots. This is one of the better experiments in bringing greater interdisciplinarity into social research, as the authors pay specific attention to social dynamics (neighbourhood relations, district social networks, and protestor community proximity) in their contagion model. In a similar vein, Davies (et al.) 43 explore how 2011 London riots have been mobilized against police crackdown, using digital communication tools to build a contagion dataset of both onset and sustained resource-generation dynamics. Ultimately, the authors discover that there is a Pareto-optimal level of police presence per each riot district that deters rioter resource mobilization; any less or more police deployment causes greater protest mobilization and resources deployed in the riot.
ICT-religion nexus is a potentially helpful disciplinary link to conflict studies, especially in terms of exploring how loose belief networks retain membership, income and resourcegeneration practices in digital space. Heidi Campbell demonstrates how Christian congregations that are geographically distant can retain 'online congregations' through live-feed sermons and chat groups 44 . These online congregations not only build awareness and disseminate frames, but also play a significant role in the material domain, in terms of fundraising and mustering numbers for protests and social responsibility projects 45 large numbers, anti-coup protestors were extremely quick in mobilizing and overwhelming checkpoints, military installations and other hotspots of conflict. In most cases, it is possible to draw direct linkages between the emergence of a particular hotspot or target on social media and the massing of crowds around it within an hour or less. We also, however, warn against the existing social network dimension of these targeting preferences. It is not only ICTs that guided people to specific locations; it is rather the dissemination of these targets through family, friend or religious congregation channels (all trusted pre-existing networks) through ICTs that created the trust network required to march towards designated spots. Future ICT-targeting studies have to take this digital-physical interaction into account.
d. Intensity and Duration
Conflict intensity and duration have grown increasingly popular in the last decade, owing to new datasets and measurement types allowing greater analytical focus. The primary thrust of the conflict intensity/duration literature has been to inform policy on the ways of shortening conflicts. 57 By reducing conflict duration, the conflict literature asserted, conflict intensity would also be reduced 58 . However, premature freezing of conflicts due to external pressure also frequently lead to a re-escalation of those conflicts once international attention wanes 59 . Therefore, the causal relationship between duration and intensity is still being negotiated in the literature as this link works differently in various political contexts. Although conflict intensity (measured as casualties) and duration (measured as months) have been explained most popularly through combatant motivation, financing, public commitment, capacity and external support 60 in the conflict literature is that ICTs make conflicts more intense 61 . This finding is being increasingly challenged by a new scholarship that focuses on the availability bias and measurement level problems of these findings. Nils Weidmann, for example, asserts convincingly that access to ICTs creates a reporting bias 62 . This reporting bias is both related to the communication of violent cases that would remain uncommunicated without ICTs and also that those with access to ICTs tend to over-share violent events compared to non-violent events in a conflict zone. This brings the need for interdisciplinarity to solve some of the availability bias and data-gathering problems related to proximity to ICT infrastructure.
Guo (et al.) 63 for example, demonstrate how betweenness centrality can offer a higher explanatory power on why certain geographies become more conflict-prone than others. They emphasize cities as hubs of communication and thus, bestow greater importance to the cities for their narrative and frame-dissemination capacity that in turn influence conflict intensity and duration patterns. In their view, conflict intensity and duration are both proportional to their distance to major cities, and also the betweenness centrality measures of major cities themselves. Walther (et al.) 64 on the other hand focus on the Sahel-Sahara to aggregate digital and pre-digital communication and archival data to generate a militant attack database. Using this database, they are able to infer which national communication and counter-insurgency policies worked better in terms of mitigating the intensity and duration of the Al Qaeda in Mali (AQIM) violence in the Sahel region. However, with the exception of these few examples, the ICTduration or intensity literature is still very young. A potential analytical field to approach the intensity/duration problem would be to engage more with the digital political communication literature.
Echo chambers and polarization are proper proxy measures to solve this deadlock. Barberá (et. al) 65 accounts that are similar in political ideology, but that such similarity disappears in non-political issues. This could be an inspirational point of departure for conflict studies as the dissemination of conflict-related information along ideological or identity lines would potentially have a significant influence on conflict intensity. Del Vicaro (et al.) 66 on the other hand, demonstrate how disinformation is especially contingent upon network ideology. Focusing on how conspiracy theories flow on Facebook, authors demonstrate that polarization becomes more observable in the dissemination of false narratives rather than accurate information. This is especially relevant for conflict research, as emotion-eliciting information tends to be fake and it is mostly fake news that provokes violent action among groups. Bastos (et al.) 67 test the same hypothesis in the Brexit campaign and discover that both accurate and inaccurate types of content are shared across a more dense and central network in the Leave camp and follows a looser and less dense network in the Stay camp. This finding is important as it hints at the role of political ideology in the dissemination of accurate and false-type conflictrelated content. In a more recent study, Cota (et al.) 68 look at a large dataset of Twitter messages from Brazil, related to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and discover that more extreme content got disseminated across a broader audience, compared to less extreme and more moderate content that had a low level of spread. This study sheds some light on potential conflict communications literature on the degree to which extreme versus moderate content becomes popular during emergencies, escalations and critical political moments. Earlier hypotheses on how ICTs might influence conflict offered promising notes. Most of them thought of greater interconnectedness and at-will information availability to have a normalizing effect on violent interactions. Importing from more traditional theories on media and conflict, the early ICT literature suggested that warring factions or mobilized masses could be 'convinced' to stand down, and attain greater mutual understanding with the rival groups (or governments), resulting in conflict termination 72 . Most of the 1990s' peacebuilding initiatives thus emphasized 'greater communication' and frequent socialization between the sides and by 2000s, most such initiatives welcomed the idea of digital communication as a peace enabler 73 . The evidence yielded a more complex and nuanced picture, however. One main misjudgment about ICT-peace link was the fact that ICTs grew into multi-directional media systems, as opposed to the uni-directional nature of TV, motion picture, or radio. This meant that 'feeding content' to warring factions, in the same manner propaganda worked in the past, was impossible 74 . Content consumers are now also content producers and dominate the mainstream agenda at-will 75 . The prevalence of multiple and competing narratives, along with the ever-present shadow of disinformation also have a chance of intensifying existing divisions, rather than healing them 76 . To counter these effects, along with attempts to skew these discussions by combing out 'unwanted content', governments have also begun increasingly reliant on censorship, net restrictions, as well as the strategic deployment of bots and trolls to further contaminate the information ecosystem 77 . However, these tools are still not dominantly in use in most conflict-prone countries as instability prevents the establishment of functioning Internet infrastructure. This severs the link between ICTs and affected communities in rural areas or poor urban districts, and renders any uni-directional move towards mediation inefficient.
From existing empirical evidence, it is hard to hypothesize that ICTs will have any standalone effect on conflict termination and peacebuilding, without interacting with material factors on the ground. Some of these material factors are already well-covered by the non-ICT conflict termination literature: external intervention, combatant resolve, leadership change, resource depletion, social change and so on. In an interaction with any of these factors, ICTs may bolster peacekeeping efforts, provided that the material factors are realistically in place and in a visible, sustained manner.
The final link in the conflict chain is attaining sustained non-violence and communitybuilding in the affected territories. Currently, there are no significant works in the field of how ICTs impact peacekeeping and community-building, leaving a sizeable analytical gap in the literature. This originates from the overwhelming focus on the earlier onset/mobilization aspects of violence, leaving a plethora of untapped topics on the later phases of violence. Yet, the literature will inevitably gravitate towards the more positive and constructive aspects of ICTs on conflict. Community-building and re-integration phase of the conflict cycle have a higher likelihood of being impacted by purely ICT-led efforts. When willingness to fight is diminished and the societal-political consensus is in place, then ICT tools can work through a multitude of ways to help bolster the peace agreement and its enforcement. Most direct and visible use of ICTs in this phase is to monitor a ceasefire and other commitment violations, enabling all parties to keep an eye on the other in a more direct way 78 . When the speed and scale advantages of ICTs are deployed after peace is attained, then these assets can significantly bolster confidencebuilding measures and render community-building and re-integration efforts more robust. In other words, ICTs will work, when there are 'physical' attempts towards reconciliation, and will remain ineffective without any social consensus or driver towards mediation.
CONCLUSION
This article has aimed to trace some of the current analytical fronts of digital conflict studies to offer a framework for IR's cybersecurity scholarship on how it could escape some of the short-term methodological and conceptual deadlocks. Most directly, the cybersecurity field suffers from an absence of granular and representative (or even indicative) data generation and sharing mechanism for the purposes of the scholarly community. This prevents an empirical testing of the majority of the claims made in cybersecurity theory, as well as impair how much we can import from the oft-mentioned 'nuclear analogy' in IR for the purposes of the cybersecurity scholarship. One of the main reasons why digital conflict studies discipline could surmount most of the hurdles posed by the emerging technologies is that the field has been building granular and representative event datasets since the 1960s. From the founding blocks of theA second major difference is that the digital conflict studies has grown far more interdisciplinary and collaborative than the cybersecurity scholarship. By focusing on human trace data to infer human conflict dynamics, the digital conflict literature has largely retained the social and human prerogatives of the field. In contrast, cybersecurity scholarship is still very much distant to the core questions of political and social fundamentals of digitalized human interactions, so far refraining from directly dealing with the role of psychology, sociology and ethnographic aspects of cybersecurity. One recent exception is Nadiya Kostyuk and Yuri Zhukov's exploration of how cyberattacks influence conflict dynamics on the front lines in Ukraine. 79 This article provides one of many potential trajectories for the cybersecurity scholarship in addressing the data availability and validity issues.
ICTs bring a set of welcome challenges and opportunities for conflict research. However, the most immediate task for the IR discipline in general is to escape yet another conflict studies entrapment when successfully adapting to the question of how emerging technologies impact world events. ICTs bring a wide array of analytical opportunities to test IR's existing mainstream theories, as well as develop new ones as digital communication enables the harvesting of both more abundant and more granular data types. These data types will not only improve our understanding of how states interact with their societies and other states in the digital domain, but will also lead the way to the formulation of more advanced types of international institutions and cooperation architectures. Regardless, conflict studies will likely continue to spearhead the IR's broader disciplinary focus on the ICTs.
While there is quite an abundance of attention on the earlier phases of social movements and violent events, there is currently a gap in the more advanced phases of such phenomena. The field is still very much nascent in explaining how ICT use affects target selection, intensity/duration, and peacebuilding efforts, but have a relatively more robust set of findings on the onset and mobilization phases. To remedy this gap, digital political communication literature seems to be the most apparent linkage for the conflict studies community. Some of the most prominent works in PolCom already have theoretical answers to how violence affects attention, emotion and mediation in critical political events and debates. 80 . The challenge of the conflict studies literature is double-pronged: first, tackle data availability and parity issues in comparative works on countries with uneven access to ICTs, and second, disentangle conflict reporting frequency from conflict occurrence frequency. Both problems may eventually solve themselves as global interconnectivity widens and ICT data becomes more representative and comparable. However, studies can still benefit significantly from exploring how yearly, generational or geographical changes in ICT use impact all five phases of conflicts discussed above. Rather than waiting for ICT data to become eventually representative, scholars may find a plethora of topics to dig into across cases in areas with different levels of digital access. Greater interdisciplinarity with the field of computer science, physics, biology and complexity fields will enable conflict researchers to generate more sophisticated models and more robust findings on this emerging frontier.
Another largely untapped topic is the role of technology companies in driving/mitigating conflict. Platform architecture, as well as increased relevance of big tech companies during crises and emergencies, render them de facto actors in all conflicts 81 . Direct effects of platform influence on conflicts, such as the decision to censor and emphasize certain types of content, or decision to partner with the governments or certain civil society actors will have an increasing influence on all phases of conflicts. However, indirect effects, such as algorithmic bias 82 , attention economy 83 and rentgeneration structures of social networks 84 will also impact conflicts and conflict actors significantly. Given the fact that platforms run on advertisement revenue and those advertisements target engagement metrics, it will be inevitable for platforms to push 80 A further line of inquiry would be whether heavy scholarly and policy attention on disinformation in Western more extreme content that elicits an emotional response and thus, generate more revenue.
The success of the emerging 'digital conflict studies' can offer three main lessons for the burgeoning cybersecurity and international relations field. First, 'cyberIR' has to prioritize building event datasets that strike a balance between data size and quality. Given the fact that conflict studies has several important datasets and data processing projects unique to the field (UCDP/PRIO 85 Council on Foreign Relations 91 have their IR-specific 'major events' data, the cases are a very unhelpfully small fraction of cybersecurity events that happen on a daily basis. Furthermore, both datasets bring in the question of 'major event according to whom?' given the heavy bias in favour of attacks against American infrastructure. Even data from Norse Corporation, FireEye, Kaspersky, Fortinet or similar cybersecurity companies are by no means representative, or transparent in terms of the methodology behind data generation. Furthermore, their full data aren't available for public use, which brings its own set of replication problems. Second, Cyber-IR scholarship has to reach beyond the confines of traditional IR theories and begin engaging more with the techno-sociology and techno-politics literature. How do states and societies perceive and prioritize the dangers of threats originating from the cybersecurity/defense domain? What is the impact of organizational, political and social differences between and within countries in politicizing and securitizing cyber threats? How do we incorporate disinformation, information overload and digital distraction into the IR's threat spectrum? How does the 'modes of production' of digital hardware, software and data impact balance of power between countries and alter state-society relations in a global scale? Should the field deal primarily with the threats faced by states (infrastructure damage, national secrecy and confidential data hacking) or the society (surveillance, data capitalism, private data protection)? Finally, the cybersecurity scholarship will have to broaden its focus of interest beyond what the major powers are doing and study the impact of major power rivalry on the rest of the world, with specific emphasis on inter-state and sub-state inequalities. Given the fact that access to advanced cybersecurity technology is a distinct privilege of only the wealthiest of nations, it is expected to create another form of hegemonic balancing and counter-balancing behaviour. How do we study regional and systemic inequalities in access to cybersecurity hardware and software infrastructure and how do these inequalities shape state behaviour and state-society relationship across different regimes and security cultures?
Ultimately, ICTs will occupy a more important place in the media-conflict nexus compared to the historical effects of the telegram, radio, TV or motion picture. This is because access to ICTs is more intimate (i.e. through smartphones that are always nearby), real-time, multi-directional and at-will compared to all previous forms of mass communication. This will also render ICT a key analytical topic in all aspects of human relations, including conflict. More focus on the communicative aspects of mobilization, movements and violence will ultimately unlock new ideas and theories of human behavior. To do this, however, this article argued in favor of the analytical value of greater interdisciplinary and more risk-taking across fields.
